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The 113th Congress extended the research and development (R&D) tax credit 
through the end of 2014 by passing the Tax Increase Prevention Act (H.R. 
5771), which President Obama signed into law on December 19, 2014. 
That the fate of this credit in 2015 remains unknown is 
not surprising. Since its inception in 1981, it has expired 
eight times, been extended 16 times, and been modified 
on several occasions. In recent years, the R&D tax credit 
was mixed into a package with other one-off tax breaks 
such as equipment deductions for small businesses and 
specific Medicare reimbursements, all of which expired 
on a regular basis and prompted political debates over 
their extensions. Such “tax extenders,” as they are some-
times called, can create an impression that the discrete 
provisions within the package are all minor pieces of 
legislation. But that impression does no justice to the 
real economic significance of the R&D tax credit.
In fiscal year 2012, U.S. firms received R&D tax 
credits totaling $11.1 billion, or about 8 percent of the 
estimated $140.9 billion spent by federal agencies on 
defense and non-defense R&D that year.1 IRS data 
from 2008 further reveal that firms in the manufac-
turing sector accounted for nearly 70 percent of total 
credits claimed, with the computer and electronic prod-
ucts, chemical, and transportation equipment industries 
benefitting the most.2
SUMMARY
• This brief explores the history, logistics, and policy implications 
of the temporary R&D tax credit, and offers recommendations 
for additional research that would help determine the merit of 
making the credit permanent.
• Using new, restricted-access IRS data and an instrumental 
variables strategy, the brief offers an unbiased estimation of 
the effectiveness of the R&D tax credit, showing that corporate 
research intensity—the ratio of R&D spending to sales—is indeed 
highly sensitive to the tax subsidy rate. When it gets cheaper for 
firms to spend on qualified R&D, they actually do spend more, 
as policymakers hope.
• Going forward, it would be helpful to know if the credit would be 
even more effective in a permanent regime, where companies 
could make long-term research plans with confidence. Further 
research also is needed to see whether the R&D tax credit leads 
to greater economic growth than would have been possible absent 
the credit, as well as whether this credit is functioning merely 
to reward firms for investing in research they would have done 
anyway. But keeping the R&D credit as a temporary “tax extender” 
seems imprudent, given its effectiveness.
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Given the importance of techno-
logical advances in stimulating long-
term economic growth, the level of 
R&D spending in the United States 
rightfully commands the attention 
of industry leaders, policymakers and 
researchers. The R&D credit, also 
known as the research and experi-
mentation (R&E) credit, rewards 
ﬁrms that increase their research 
spending with a tax credit worth up 
to 20 percent of their expenditures 
above a determined, firm-specific base 
amount. According to the GAO, large 
corporations have dominated the use 
of this credit, and two-thirds of large 
companies surveyed in 2015 stated 
that they utilize the federal R&D 
credit.3, 4
Aside from the United States’ 
direct and indirect efforts to sup-
port R&D generally through federal 
agencies and grants, federal tax law 
offers two incentives for private R&D: 
a deduction for qualiﬁed research 
spending under Section 174 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and a 
non-refundable tax credit for qualiﬁed 
research spending above a base 
amount under IRC Section 41. These 
two tax advantages reduce the after-
tax price of R&D investment and 
jointly are referred to as the “R&D tax 
credit” in this brief. It is their com-
bined effect on the after-tax price of, 
and impact on, R&D spending that 
I assess here. This brief explores the 
history and logistics of the R&D tax 
credit, sheds new light on its effective-
ness, and considers recent legislative 
reform proposals and the policy issues 
that continue to challenge the cur-
rent iteration of the credit. Given the 
effectiveness of the “temporary” tax 
credit in spurring R&D spending, the 
brief also offers recommendations for 
additional research that would help 
determine the merit of making the 
credit permanent.
HOW THE CREDIT WORKS
Congress first adopted a tax credit for 
R&D expenditures as part of the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in 
order to stanch the decline in private 
R&D which took hold in the early 
1970’s. Intentionally designed to be 
temporary so as to reduce its impact 
on the federal budget, the credit was 
the first of its kind. It allowed ﬁrms 
to earn a tax credit on spending they 
already were able to expense under 
the existing Section 174 expensing 
provision.5
Seeking to incentivize corpora-
tions to invest in new R&D that 
may or may not have had a practical 
application for their own businesses, 
the original credit rewarded quali-
fied research expenditures (QREs) in 
excess of what the ﬁrm would have 
spent in the absence of the credit by 
lowering the after-tax cost of qualified 
research. The economic rationale for 
this tax break was that private R&D 
spending creates spillover effects that 
benefit society at large but cannot be 
captured entirely by the firm doing 
the spending, despite the abundance 
of intellectual property protections 
available in the U.S. Further, subsi-
dizing marginal R&D expenditures 
may afford U.S. firms a competitive 
advantage in global markets. 
The credit deﬁned a ﬁrm’s base 
level of R&D spending and granted a 
tax credit equal to a fraction of spend-
ing above that base level. Originally, 
the credit was equal to 25 percent of 
QREs above the base amount. The 
base was defined as the firm’s aver-
age qualiﬁed R&D spending in the 
previous three years or 50 percent 
of current spending, whichever was 
greater. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
later reduced the statutory credit rate 
from 25 to 20 percent. 
Because a ﬁrm’s base was origi-
nally a moving average of its past 
spending, adding qualiﬁed research 
spending in any given year would 
 1 Office of Management and Budget. “Analytical Perspec-
tives, Fiscal Year 2014,” 2013.
 2  U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy. “In-
vesting in U.S. Competitiveness: The Benefits of Enhancing 
the Research and Experimentation (R&E) Tax Credit,” 
March 25, 2011. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-cen-
ter/tax-policy/Documents/Investing-in-US-Competitive-
ness-Benefits-of-RandE-Tax-Credit-3-2011.pdf
 3  U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). “The Re-
search Tax Credit’s Design and Administration Can Be 
Improved,” GAO-10-136, November 6, 2009. http://www.
gao.gov/products/GAO-10-136
 4  Summary of the BDO USA LLP 2015 Survey of 100 tax di-
rectors of large public companies available at http://blogs.
wsj.com/cfo/2015/04/09/rd-tax-credits-lead-investment-
decisions-survey/. Reference: BDO.
 5  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 later re-
quired firms to reduce their Section 174 deduction by the 
entire amount of research credits claimed.
 6  Congressional Research Service (CRS). “Research Tax 
Credit: Current Law and Policy Issues for the 114th Con-
gress,” March 13, 2015. http://nationalaglawcenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL31181.pdf.
 7  CRS.
 8  For a detailed account of the specifics of each requirement 
and how they have changed over time, see CRS.
 9  U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Treasury Issues Final 
Regulations Clarifying Research and Experimentation 
Expenditure Rules for Businesses,” Press Release, July 
23, 2014. http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/
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increase the ﬁrm’s base by one-third of 
the increase in each of the subsequent 
three years, essentially tempering the 
continued use of the credit, as the tax 
credit was only given for a percentage 
above the base. This provision cre-
ated dynamic disincentives for current 
qualiﬁed R&D spending, leading 
to negative marginal credit rates for 
some ﬁrms and lower than statu-
tory rates for many others. To fix this 
issue, in 1989, Congress established a 
new formula for the base as the ﬁrm’s 
average gross receipts in the previous 
four tax years multiplied by the ﬁrm’s 
“ﬁxed-base percentage,” a measure 
of historic research intensity, or 50 
percent of current qualiﬁed spend-
ing, whichever was greater. The ﬁrm’s 
ﬁxed-base percentage was defined as 
and remains its ratio of total qualiﬁed 
R&D expenditures to total gross 
receipts between 1984 and 1988, 
subject to a 16 percent ceiling. Start-
ups and ﬁrms lacking gross receipts or 
QREs for the years between 1984 and 
1988 were assigned a three percent 
ﬁxed-base percentage.
Since its inception, the traditional 
credit’s incentive effect has varied 
widely among firms, in part due to 
the 1984-1988 fixed-base percentage 
and also due to the requirement that 
the base amount for the credit not 
be less than 50 percent of current tax 
year QREs, in order to receive the 20 
percent statutory rate. In other words, 
when current QREs exceed twice the 
historically deﬁned base, the redeﬁned 
base is increased 50 cents for each 
additional dollar of R&D spending. 
Overall, 3.5 to 9.5 percent of ﬁrms (5 
to 16 percent of ﬁrms earning a credit) 
between 1981 and 1990 had marginal 
credit rates equal to the statutory rate, 
depending on the year. In some cases, 
circumstances around credit incentives 
have led established firms to invest 
less in R&D as a share of revenues.6
THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The R&D tax credit that expired at 
the end of 2014 consisted of four 
components: the traditional research 
credit that has been discussed above, 
an alternative simplified credit (ASC), 
the university basic research credit 
for fostering collaboration with U.S. 
higher education institutions, and 
the energy research credit. The latter 
two could be claimed in conjunction 
with one of the former two if a firm 
qualified.7
The ASC, a research tax credit 
that ﬁrms can permanently opt for in 
lieu of the traditional research credit, 
was introduced in 2007 for ﬁrms that 
struggle to qualify for the traditional 
R&D tax credit despite the traditional 
credit’s start-up provisions. Currently 
the ASC provides a credit equal to 
14 percent of current year QREs 
that exceed 50 percent of the aver-
age QREs for the three preceding tax 
years. In the beginning of 2009, the 
ASC replaced the Alternative Incre-
mental Research Credit (AIRC) elec-
tion, which was available to firms that 
could not claim the traditional credit 
from 1996 through 2008. The tradi-
tional research credit and the ASC are 
mutually exclusive, and the choice of 
which to claim comes down to QREs. 
THE QRE ISSUE
Under IRC rules, qualified research 
expenditures have had to satisfy four 
loosely defined requirements. Qualify-
ing activities must be “experimental;” 
the sought-after knowledge must be 
“technological in nature;” and the 
research must be aimed at developing 
a “new business component.” Lastly, 
this component must have “a new or 
improved function, performance or 
reliability or quality.” In other words, 
detailing or aesthetically tweaking 
current products or processes does not 
qualify. Upon first glance, a reasonable 
person might disagree with another 
reasonable person about what does 
final-regulations-rande.aspx.
 10  Internal Revenue Code, Section 41 Credit for Increasing 
Research Activities. http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-regs/
research_credit_basic_sec41.pdf.
 11  U.S. Department of the Treasury. “General Explanations of 
the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals,” 
February 2015. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-cen-
ter/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.
pdf.
 12  CRS.
 13  BDO.
 14  The IV strategy directly addresses the simultaneity of R&D 
spending and marginal credit rates.
 15  Rao, Nirupama. “Do Tax Credits Stimulate R&D Spend-
ing? The Effect of the R&D Tax Credit in its First Decade,” 
Forthcoming, 2015. http://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/
publications/RD032014.pdf.
 16  GAO.
 17  For more information, see the joint report from the Treasury 
Department and White House entitled “The President’s 
Framework for Business Tax Reform” from February 2012. 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Docu-
ments/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-
Reform-02-22-2012.pdf.
 18  Hall, B. H., and J. Van Reenen. “How Effective are Fiscal 
Incentives for R&D? A Review of the Evidence,” Research 
Policy, 29, 449–469. 2000.
 19  Treasury, 2011.
 20  Treasury, 2015.
 21  GAO.
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and does not qualify as a QRE, and 
disputes between industry, the IRS, 
and Treasury have persisted since the 
introduction of the tax credit.8
In the fall of 2013, the Treasury 
Department broadened the ability 
of firms to claim QREs by allowing 
them access to the credit for a new 
product, even when they are able to 
sell the product to their customers 
directly and benefit early and often 
from their own research. The final 
regulations were issued in the summer 
of 2014 and specified that “subsequent 
actions taken by the taxpayer’s trade 
or business with the product have 
no effect on the eligibility of R&E 
expenditures for a tax deduction if the 
expenditures are otherwise qualify-
ing R&E expenditures.”9 Notably, 
these rules are retroactive, so firms can 
accrue tax benefits for previous years, 
and they will be implemented without 
a mandate to estimate the budgetary 
impact for which they will be respon-
sible—potential lost revenue included.
So which expenditures count as 
qualified and which do not? Eligible 
QREs include wages for in-house 
R&D; supplies, like prototypes and 
testing materials; contract research; 
and basic research payments to quali-
fied non-profit organizations. Accord-
ing to the Treasury Department, 
approximately 70 percent of QREs 
are labor costs. Excluded research 
expenditures for the purposes of IRC 
Section 41 are adaptations of exist-
ing business components for specific 
customers; studies related to market 
research, data collection, and qual-
ity control; software for internal use 
only; research conducted outside the 
U.S.; and all research related to the 
social sciences, arts, or humanities.10 
These lists are not comprehensive, but 
do illustrate the complex system that 
firms must navigate before calculating 
the portion of their total R&D spend-
ing that may qualify for the research 
credit. 
This complexity is especially 
problematic, as it creates compliance 
challenges for firms and enforcement 
challenges for the IRS, as companies 
claiming the credit automatically trig-
ger audit flags.11 Concerned about the 
legitimacy of late or amended claims 
for the credit, the IRS decided to 
designate “research credit claims” as a 
tier 1 compliance issue in 2007, open-
ing the approval of these credits up to 
subjective judgments and interpreta-
tions.12 At the same time, it’s possible 
that some firms that are eligible for the 
tax credit don’t take advantage of it. 
These compliance challenges and 
information barriers can carry serious 
economic implications. Among com-
panies planning to expand into new 
U.S. markets within the next three 
years, three-quarters listed tax credits, 
exemptions and reductions as having 
the greatest impact on that decision, 
in a 2015 survey. Of the 35 percent 
of companies that did not use R&D 
credits, a majority thought they could 
not qualify for it.13 This belief can be 
consequential, for as detailed in my 
research, described below, there has 
been a clear and significant increase 
in R&D spending among those firms 
that have claimed the tax credit.
A NEW UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE CREDIT’S 
EFFECTIVENESS
In my recent paper, I use new, 
restricted access IRS data and an 
instrumental variables (IV) strategy14 
to determine an unbiased estimation 
of the effectiveness of the R&D tax 
credit and whether it actually increases 
corporate research spending as 
intended.15 I focus on the years 1981 
through 1991—the last year prior 
to the credit’s ﬁrst lapse in 1992—
because tax policy changes that were 
common in the credit’s early years and 
critical to the identification strategy 
have been absent more recently. The 
IRS data is necessary to accurately 
measure firms’ marginal credit rates, 
which are diffcult to infer from annual 
R&D spending as reported in pub-
lic ﬁnancial ﬁlings. R&D expenses 
reported publicly in 10-k filings and 
compiled in Compustat conform to 
a broader deﬁnition of R&D that 
includes both R&D conducted abroad 
and domestic research expenditures 
that do not qualify for the R&D tax 
credit because they fail to meet QRE 
criteria. If ﬁrms respond to changes in 
subsidies for qualiﬁed R&D by rear-
ranging their shares of qualiﬁed and 
non-qualiﬁed spending, there is little 
way of identifying such movements 
through public data alone. Because 
a ﬁrm’s credit rate is determined by 
its relative QREs, changes in the 
composition of spending can affect 
credit rates. In comparing tax subsidy 
measures constructed from previously 
studied public ﬁnancial data to tax 
subsidy measures constructed using 
IRS data, I find that they differ widely 
and that the differences vary from year 
to year, suggesting that the public data 
could lead to biased elasticity esti-
mates of the effect of the tax credit on 
firm spending. 
The IRS statement of income 
(SOI) data are drawn from a panel 
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sample of corporate tax returns (Form 
1120), with items relating to R&D 
spending pulled from Form 6765. 
Among other details, the data report 
annual QREs, base amounts, tentative 
R&D tax credits, and limitations due 
to insuficient tax liabilities. Because 
the IRS SOI data include both public 
and private ﬁrms and do not overs-
ample large ﬁrms, only a small set of 
ﬁrms appear in both the Compustat 
and IRS SOI data. In general, the 
Compustat data suggest that more 
ﬁrms—from 2.7 to nearly 22 percent, 
depending on the year—qualify for an 
R&D tax credit than actually do (see 
Figure 1). 
Despite the improved accuracy 
of the IRS data, firms typically only 
report the details of research spend-
ing in years when they apply for the 
R&D tax credit. If, for example, a firm 
has insufficient income tax liabilities 
and does not apply for a credit, its 
qualiﬁed spending is unknown, and 
missing values appear as zeros on the 
SOI, likely understating R&D spend-
ing. Additionally, IRS SOI data only 
report QREs and do not provide any 
sense of how a ﬁrm’s non-qualiﬁed 
spending responds to subsidies for 
qualiﬁed spending. Shifting or re-
labeling expenses as QREs may be 
occurring behind the scenes, but this 
lack of information limits any analysis. 
FINDINGS
My estimates of the price elasticity 
for R&D expenditures imply that 
corporate research intensity—the 
ratio of R&D spending to sales—is 
highly sensitive to the tax subsidy rate. 
Short-run elasticity estimates exceed 
one, meaning that a 10 percent reduc-
tion in the cost of R&D leads the 
average firm to increase its research 
intensity by more than 10 percent. In 
other words, when it gets cheaper to 
spend on qualified R&D, firms actu-
ally do spend more, as policymakers 
hope. Analysis shows that wages and 
supplies account for the bulk of the 
increase in research spending. In the 
long-run, R&D expenditures increase 
even more over time, but firms do 
not time their research spending to 
maximize their R&D tax credits. This 
perhaps reflects uncertainty about the 
continued existence of the credit. In 
a dynamic analysis, I find that small 
and young ﬁrms appear more respon-
sive and their short-run response is 
stronger, suggesting that they may face 
lower adjustment costs or liquidity 
constraints in ﬁnancing R&D. Elas-
ticities of qualiﬁed and total (qualiﬁed 
and non-qualiﬁed) research intensities 
from a smaller sample of firms suggest 
that they do respond to changes in the 
user cost largely by increasing their 
qualiﬁed spending, meaning that the 
type of R&D which the federal credit 
deems qualiﬁed research is, in fact, an 
important margin on which the credit 
affects ﬁrm behavior. 
But there are some important 
caveats regarding broader interpreta-
tions of this analysis. For example, 
research decisions made by firms over 
thirty years ago may not represent 
current spending by industry, size, 
domicile, etc. Also, my analysis does 
not assess the impact of ﬁrms’ expec-
tations of future R&D tax credits 
on research spending. During its 
ﬁrst decade, the credit was always 
renewed before it expired. Since then, 
the credit has been allowed to lapse 
several times, most of the time being 
reinstated retroactively. On one occa-
sion in 1995, however, the credit was 
simply allowed to expire for a year. 
In the present, less predictable ﬁscal 
environment, estimates from an era 
of greater certainty may not be fully 
applicable.
Looking beyond my own find-
ings, other research on the tax credit 
has proven insightful in recent years. 
The GAO determined that in 2005 
the credit reduced the after-tax price 
of additional qualified research by 
an estimated 6.4 to 7.3 percent. The 
range here is due to assumptions 
about discount rates and the length of 
any delay in using the tax credit—an 
FIGURE 1: SAMPLE OF SAME FIRMS CLAIMING THE R&D TAX CREDIT  
BY DATA SOURCE
0%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Compustat Data  
(Publicly Available)
IRS SOI Data
(Restricted Access)
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important point, given the GAO’s 
discovery that 44 percent of total net 
credits earned in 2005 could not be 
used immediately. Since the R&D tax 
credit is a component of the Gen-
eral Business Credit (since the 1986 
legislation), these unused credits are 
subject to a yearly cap and can be car-
ried back one year or carried forward 
twenty years. Even more noteworthy, 
the GAO identified disparities in 
the incentives provided to differ-
ent firms. Some received no credit 
while others were eligible for credits 
up to 13 percent of their marginal 
R&D spending.16 Furthermore, their 
analysis found that a significant por-
tion of credits were earned for spend-
ing that firms would have done even 
without the tax advantage and were 
not used to support the kinds of new 
research with spillover effects origi-
nally intended by the legislation. A 
major part of the problem, the GAO 
concluded, was the traditional credit’s 
1980’s fixed-base percentage.
Also, a study commissioned by the 
Obama administration concluded in 
2012 that each dollar of foregone tax 
revenue from the credit causes firms 
to invest at least a dollar in R&D. The 
administration relied on estimates 
from the Treasury Department which 
indicate that the elasticity for research 
spending is around -1, meaning that 
the research credit produces a dollar-
for dollar-increase in research spend-
ing.17 Other scholarly research finds 
even larger effects.18 There is general 
agreement in the research that the tax 
credit increases qualified R&D invest-
ments made by firms.
FIGURE 2: RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO EXTEND AND/OR MODIFY THE R&D TAX CREDIT
 
 S. 2260 H.R. 4438 and H.R. 4 H.R. 880 FY2016 Budget  
Traditional Credit Through 2015 Permanent (Modified) Permanent (Modified) Through 2015 
Extension (Modified)   (Current), then 
    Permanent (Modified)
Changes to the Full amount of the Equal to 20% of Same as H.R. 4438 Repealed after 2015 
Traditional Credit credit can be applied current tax year QREs and H.R. 4  
 to the corporate AMT above a base amount  ASC credit rate 
  (base = 50% of the Also, full amount of increased from 14% to 
 Up to $250,000 of the previous three tax the credit can be 18% and allowed to 
 credit can be applied year’s average annual applied to the offset AMT liability 
 to current tax year payroll QREs), plus similar corporate AMT for  
 taxes when income tax statutory changes to the eligible small firms 
 liabilities are insufficient university and energy 
  research credits
Changes to Credit for N/A Equal to 10% of current Same as H.R. 4438 and Eliminate the reduced 
Firms with Insufficient  tax year QREs (and H.R. 4 ASC rate of 6% for businesses 
QRE History  university research payments)  without QREs in previous three 
years 
  If less than three years   
  of QREs/payments
Status Passed by Senate Both Passed by House (2014) Introduced to House Requested by 
 Finance Committee (2014)  Ways and Means President (2015) 
   Committee (2015)
Sorces https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2260 
 https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4 
 https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4438 
 https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr88  
 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf  
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As private sector companies continue 
to lobby for a permanent tax credit, 
which would eliminate the uncer-
tainty in calculating the after-tax cost 
of R&D investments, future research 
that assesses how policy certainty 
affects research credit responses 
would be useful to policymakers, as 
they decide whether a longer-term 
commitment to the research credit is 
worth the budgetary cost. 
There is little reason to believe 
that the firm’s ratio of research spend-
ing to gross receipts from nearly three 
decades ago, when multiplied by its 
average gross receipts over the prior 
four years, is an appropriate base for 
firms.19 Indeed, policymakers them-
selves acknowledge this, as is evident 
from recent legislation proposed in 
both houses of Congress (see Figure 
2). There are several reasons why the 
credit has not already been made 
permanent, but lost revenue seems to 
be the main culprit, at least from a 
political perspective.
In response to the modifications 
to the R&D tax credit requested in 
President Obama’s fiscal year 2016 
budget proposal, the Treasury Depart-
ment projected that repealing the tra-
ditional credit and making permanent 
the ASC with an increased statutory 
rate of 18 percent would cost the fed-
eral government $127.7 billion over 
the next decade.20 However, tradi-
tional budget models do not measure 
the dynamic effects of legislation, so 
determining the second order effects 
of extending the credit would provide 
a more accurate projection of the cost 
of permanence, beyond the simple 
static effect to the Treasury’s coffers.
Though the GAO suggests that 
adding a minimum base to the ASC 
and eliminating the traditional credit 
may solve the incentive issue detailed 
above21, enhancing the ASC could 
leave more ﬁrms with negative credit 
rates in some years in the way that 
the traditional credit did before the 
1989 base reformulation. Given the 
high and robust elasticities estimated 
in my research, any policy shift that 
would lead to lower credit rates could 
substantially reduce corporate research 
spending. Redirecting tax expendi-
tures away from the traditional credit 
and toward the ASC therefore should 
be considered carefully.
CONCLUSION
The “temporary” R&D tax credit is 
effective at spurring research spend-
ing, as my recent findings show. 
Going forward, it would be helpful to 
know if the credit would be effective 
in a permanent regime where com-
panies can make long-term research 
plans with confidence. Understanding 
exactly why qualified expenditures 
appear to be so much more responsive 
than broader definitions of R&D—
that is, whether firms are re-allocating 
research expenditures from non-
qualified to qualified, or are simply 
re-labeling research spending—would 
also be useful in designing a perma-
nent research credit. Without these 
latter insights, an accurate determina-
tion cannot be made about whether 
the R&D tax credit leads to greater 
economic growth than would have 
been possible absent the credit, nor 
can we conclude definitively whether 
or not this credit is functioning 
merely as a windfall for a select few 
companies and rewarding them for 
investing in research they would have 
done anyway. Continuing to lump 
this credit in with “tax extenders” and 
subjecting it to frequent, short-term 
renewal debates seems imprudent for 
such an effective tool. The consider-
ation of permanency as proposed in 
much of the recent legislation appears 
warranted.
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